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In most liberalized electricity markets, abuse of market power is a concern related to oligopolistic 
market structures, flaws in market architecture, and the specific characteristics of electricity generation 
and demand. Several methods have been suggested to improve the competitiveness of the liberalized 
electricity markets and to reallocate rents from generators to consumers. In this paper we study to what 
extend  divestitures  can  improve  the  competitiveness  of  the  electricity  market.  We  quantify  the 
expected developments under different divestiture scenarios for the German market, using Cournot 
and Supply Function Equilibrium simulations. We find an overall welfare gain in both models and 
show  that  those  gains are  highest  if the  divested assets  are sold  to  independent  and  small  firms, 
preventing the formation of additional firms that set prices strategically. 
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1   Introduction 
Liberalized electricity markets are frequently subject to market power concerns due to an oftentimes 
oligopolistic market structure, flaws in market architecture, and specific characteristic of electricity 
like highly inelastic final demand. Most European markets show a high degree of concentration and 
the lack  of  sufficient  cross  border  transmission  capacities  makes  most  markets  national in  nature 
(London Economics, 2007). In the light of this situation the European Commission is concerned about 
the future competitiveness
2 and there is an ongoing debate what measures are needed and reasonable 
to  address  these  concerns.  The  German  electricity  market  is  no  exception:  the  current  wholesale 
market is dominated by four companies owning about 80% of conventional power plant capacity. 
Furthermore, the German Cartel Office classifies as dominant the duopoly consisting of E.ON and 
RWE  with  about  60%  of  generation  (Bundeskartellamt,  2006).
3  This  claim  is  opposed  by  E.ON 
showing that their position reduced in recent years and the duopoly now only accounts for 40% of the 
market (E.ON, 2010). However, due to significant electricity price increases in the last years, a debate 
about potential market power abuse and structural remedies has emerged in Germany (Weigt and 
Hirschhausen, 2008).  
One  possible  remedy  to  address  market  power  and  competition  concerns  is  the  divestiture  of 
generation assets of dominant firms to increase the number of market participants. From a political and 
legal  point  of  view  divestitures  are  considered  a  “hard”  instrument  compared  to  other  possible 
measures like market  monitoring or fostering  market entry, as legal barriers are typically high, a 
revision of the divestiture is not possible, and consequently opposition by firms is high. Nevertheless, 
divestitures have been applied to increase or retain competition in merger cases (Hirschhausen et al., 
2007). In Germany the possibility of divesting companies due to abuse of dominance is not included 
into the competition law but was proposed so by the Hessian Ministry of Economics (2007); more 
recently, the German Economics Ministry even prepared a law based on the idea (which was rejected 
by one of the ruling parties, though). However, the European Commission required E.ON to divest 
about 5 GW of generation assets to address concerns of the abuse of a dominant market position in the 
wholesale market (case COMP/39.388) under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU).  
In this paper we analyze the impact of divestiture on dominant firms in the German electricity market. 
We apply two different model types to simulate strategic company behavior: Cournot and Supply 
Function models. We simulate the expected market outcome under several divestitures scenarios. Both 
models are calibrated to the observed market data and the current market structure as in Willems et al. 
(2009). The amount  of  contracts  that firms  sign  (which is  not  observed)  is used  as a  calibration 
parameter. We then change the market structure and predict the market outcome under the assumption 
                                                       
2  See:  Communication  from  the  Commission  -  Inquiry  pursuant  to  Article  17  of  Regulation  (EC)  No  1/2003  into  the 
European gas and electricity sectors (Final Report) {SEC(2006) 1724}. 
3 According to the German Law  Against  Restraints on Competition two companies are assumed to have a dominant market 
position if they have a joint share of at least 50% of the relevant market (§ 19 Abs. 1 GWB).  
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that the amount of contracts remains constant. Two divestiture scenarios are tested: First the divested 
assets are assumed to be bought by new market participants (e.g. foreign firms or large utilities) 
increasing the total number of strategic players from four to six (six firm case). Second, the assets are 
assumed  to  be  bought  by  fringe  companies  (e.g.  several  smaller  companies  or  non-energy 
stakeholders), thus increasing the market share of price taking companies (large fringe case). The 
results of both the Cournot and SFE model are compared to test the robustness of the forecasts.  
The  remainder  of  our  paper  is  structured  as  follows:  in  the  next  section  a  literature  review  on 
competition policy and divestiture in electricity markets is provided. In Section 3 the implementation 
of the models and the underlying assumptions are described. Section 4 presents the scenarios and 
discusses the simulation results.  Section  5 closes  with a  summary  and  our  conclusions  about  the 
potential impacts of divestitures in the German electricity market. 
 
2  Literature Review 
One of the possible tools to increase the competitiveness of oligopolistic electricity markets is the 
divestiture of existing generation capacities to increase the number of market participants. Particularly 
in the US, antitrust and merger divestitures are a common tool, and competition authorities can base 
their action on a significant body of experience and analytical work (e.g., see FTC, 1999). Under 
European  legislation,  divestitures  used  to  be  limited  to  merger  control  under  the  EC  Merger 
Regulation (e.g., see EC, 2005). Willis and Hughes (2008) provide a legal viewpoint on the issue of 
structural remedies in the circumstances of energy  merger cases and Lévêque (2007) reviews the 
experiences  within  Europe  with  merger  based  remedies.  With  EC  Regulation  1/2003  structural 
remedies have been extended to cases under Article 101 and 102 including cases against E.ON related 
to the wholesale and balancing market (see Chauve et al. 2009), against RWE related to a possible 
foreclosure its natural gas network (see Koch et al., 2009), and a case against ENI in the natural gas 
market (COMP/39.315).  
One  further  exception  to  merger  based  divestitures  in  the  EU  is  the  liberalization  of  the  British 
electricity  market  where  it  was  applied  for  competitive  purposes  without  involving  a  merger  or 
acquisition (Sweeting, 2007).  
Several  studies  analyze  and  summarize  experiences  with  competition  policy,  merger  cases,  and 
divestitures  in  liberalized  markets.  Hirschhausen  et  al.  (2007)  give  an  overview  of  international 
experiences with divestiture in energy markets in the US and in Europe focusing on both merger cases 
and “pure” divestitures. Practical experiences with divestiture in electricity markets can be drawn from 
the UK and from California. In the former case divestiture has been applied twice in order to improve 
the competitiveness of the market (Sweeting, 2007). Newbery and Pollitt (1997), Pollitt and Domah 
(2001) and Littlechild (2006) provide empirical evidence on the positive effects of restructuring on 
efficiency and welfare. In California divestiture was applied to reduce the market power potentials for 
the incumbents and increase the number of marker participants. Although, the divestiture resulted in  
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an  HHI  below  1000  (Blumstein  et  al.  2002),  the  liberalization  failed  due  to  flaws in  the  market 
architecture and the lack of vertical integration between retailers and producers (Bushnell et al., 2008). 
Wolak and McRae (2008) discuss the remedies imposed in a US merger case between Exelon and 
PSEG including divestiture of assets with low opportunity costs.   
In the course of the European liberalization several countries have applied “virtual” divestitures to 
cope with competition concerns. Virtual divestiture refers to a spin-off of generation capacities of an 
incumbent without changing the property right structure of these facilities. Thus, the divestiture is a 
mere financial transaction, not a physical one.
4 The advantage of virtual divestitures can be seen in the 
possibility to withdraw the measure after a certain time, or to continue if the desired outcome has not 
been accomplished.  We will not discuss those virtual divestitures in our paper.  
Several studies address pre- and post-divestiture states in electricity markets via modeling approaches 
or empirical analyses. Green and Newbery (1992) are among the first to use SFE for electricity market 
analysis. They compare the duopoly of National Power and PowerGen in the British market with a 
hypothetical five firm oligopoly, concluding that the latter results in a range of supply functions closer 
to marginal costs. Green (1996) applies the SFE approach to analyze the divestiture decision in 1994, 
when National Power and PowerGen had to dispose 15% of their capacity, comparing this decision to 
a more stringent restructuring into five firms and the impact of new investments. He concludes that 
although  a  drastic  splitting  of  the  generators  would  have  had  the  greatest  effect,  the  political 
infeasibility makes the conducted divestiture a valid and effective option. Brunekreeft (2001) applies a 
multiple-unit, multiple-period auction approach to analyze the British electricity pool. He shows that 
decreasing (increasing) the number of firms in the market increases (decreases) both the bids and the 
markups as larger firms have little incentives to undercut the preceding bids and thus raise the system 
marginal price. Day and Bunn (2001) apply a computational modeling approach to the second round 
of  capacity  divestiture  in  the  liberalized  electricity  market  of  England  and  Wales  in  1999.  They 
conclude that although the divestiture was substantial, it may still be insufficient to pave the way to a 
fully competitive market. Evans and Green (2005) apply an SFE model with symmetric firms with 
non-linear cost functions and a competitive fringe to analyze the British market before and after the 
introduction of NETA in March 2001. They show that the observed price reduction can not directly be 
explained by the introduction of NETA whereas the reduction of market concentration due to the 
divestiture of the two large generators and new power plants had a significant impact on wholesale 
prices.   
Moselle et al. (2006) analyze the Dutch electricity market and design a Cournot model including a 
competitive fringe and forward contracts to test the divestiture requirement in the Nuon-Essent merger 
case. They show that although the Commission’s guidelines (relying on HHI indices) are already 
fulfilled with a divestiture of 1900 MW, a total of 4200 MW is necessary if one wants to avoid the 
merged firm to remain pivotal. Ishii and Yan (2006) analyze the impact of imposed divestitures within  
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the  restructuring  process  in  US  electricity  markets  on  new  power  plant  investments.  Based  on 
observations between 1996 and 2000, they develop a net present value model estimating the expected 
profit  of  investment  with  and  without  divestiture  opportunities  to  determine  whether  divestitures 
“crowded out” new investment projects. They conclude that divestitures crowded out on average only 
177  MW  of  new  capacity,  which  is  low  compared to  the  70  GW  divested  and  60  GW  invested 
generation capacity between 1996 and 2000.  
Federico and López (2009) study divestitures in electricity markets in a setting with a dominant firm 
and a competitive fringe. They show that the divestment of units that are price setting before the 
divestiture are the most efficient divestment option in terms of price reduction.  
Rahimiyan and Mashhadi (2010) evaluate the efficiency of divestitures in electricity markets using (1) 
an  analytic  model  to  determine  the  market  concentration  (measured  as  the  Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index) respecting the actual dispatch and network capacity restrictions and (2) an agent-based model 
adjusting the bidding behavior of agents via learning. The first method provides a range of possible 
market concentrations correlated to specific dispatch conditions and can be applied even if no detailed 
cost data is available. Additionally the second method provides an impact assessment of local market 
power.  Tanaka  (2009)  analyzes  the  Japanese  electricity  market  using  a  transmission  constrained 
Cournot  model.  Besides  simulating  the  impact  of  upgrading  the  existing  bottlenecks  within  the 
network he also simulates the divestiture of the largest electricity company into two to four companies. 
Those cases lead to a significant reduction in deadweight welfare loss and a more efficient use of 
existing network capacities reducing the need for upgrades. In a Cournot setting Vasconcelos (2007) 
analyzes the connection between efficiency gains of mergers and structural remedies imposed by the 
antitrust authority who is actively aiming at maximizing consumer surplus. He shows that divestitures 
create new merger possibilities and the authority tends to over-fix the amount of divestiture and thus 
tries to obtain a more competitive market after the divestiture than before. Leveque (2006) argues on 
the other hand that the antitrust authorities should do more than restoring the ex-ante situation but 
considers  it  still  an  open  question  to  what  extend  antitrust  enforcement  is  needed  in  Europe’s 
electricity and natural gas markets. 
 
3  Model formulation, data and calibration 
We will apply both Cournot and SFE models in our simulations. In earlier work (Willems et al., 2009) 
we show that with the publically available data, it is impossible to determine empirically which type of 
model (Cournot or SFE) better reflects the current market situation in Germany. In order to obtain 
robust predictions we implement both models.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
4 Virtual divestitures (Willems, 2006) have been applied or considered as measurement in the merger case for instance in the 
proposed Nuon-Essent merger in the Netherlands, for a vertical merger by Electrabel in Belgium, for the allowance of EDF 
to acquire EnBW shares, and in a merger case involving CEZ in the Czech Republic,   
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3.1  Reference Model 
A  pre-divestiture  benchmark  is  needed  prior  to  testing  the  impact  of  divestitures  on  the  German 
electricity  market.  Therefore,  the  model  structure  presented  in  Willems  et  al.  (2009)  is  extended 
beyond the first two months of 2006 to cover the complete year. The analysis looks at peak hours only, 
because strategic company behavior is more likely to occur in hours with high demand and tighter 
capacity situations, and secondly, the model structure with approximated cost functions and simplified 
market interactions is not well-suited to capture the unit commitment process determining pricing in 
off-peak periods.
5  
The residual German demand D during peak hours is assumed to be price inelastic, varying through 
time t, and with a random component ε: 
  t t t D e a - =                     (1) 
Oligopolists face an elastic residual demand due to imports from neighboring countries. Imports QI are 






nt n Gt I It p p Q e d m g g ∑ ∑ + + - =             (2) 
Hourly  price  data  is  taken  from  energy  exchanges  in  the  Netherlands,  France,  Austria,  Poland, 
Sweden, East Denmark and West Denmark. Imports QI  are obtained from ETSOVista (2007). One 
import elasticity γI for the entire peak period in 2006 is calculated. The residual demand function for 
the oligopolists D
O  rewrites to:  
  t Gt I t
O
t p D e g a - - =                 (3) 
Equation (3) is transformed into a demand function with a specified set of demand realizations k: 
  k k k p D D - - = g a                   (4) 
The intercept of the demand level is chosen such that when the shock is zero, either 95% of the 
observations in the German market are below the demand function or a maximum price of 200 €/MWh 
is obtained.
7  
Marginal  generation  costs  of each  oligopolist  are  based on the each  player’s  generation  portfolio 
(VGE, 2006). Plant capacities are decreased by seasonal availability factors following Hoster (1996). 
Marginal cost functions are estimated for each month separately, based on the plants efficiency and 
monthly fuel prices calculated as the average monthly cross-border prices for gas, oil and coal from 
Bafa (2006). The step-wise marginal cost functions of the generators are simplified to a cubic function 
where the parameters of the function (λ) are found by minimizing the weighted squared difference of 
                                                       
5 Due to ramping constraints, start-up restrictions, and start-up costs market prices during off-peak periods can fall below 
marginal generation costs (see Abrell et al., 2008). 
6  δz is a vector of time dummies (day of week) for all hours t in the peak period. A two-stage least squares estimator is used 
to address the endogeneity of the German price pG with respect to imports. As instruments the total demand level in Germany 
and German wind production is used. 
7 The second condition became necessary as in July 2006 a large fraction of peak hours was exceptionally high resulting in 
unrealistic imports as the import estimation neglects transmission capacities.  
  7
the parameterized function and the true cost function subject to the condition that marginal cost should 





2 1 0 ik i ik i ik i i ik q q q c l l l l + + + =               (5) 
Following Anderson and Hu (2008), the continuity of the bid supply function is imposed specifying a 
piece-wise linear supply function, with 0 1 ik x < < : 
[ ] 1 1 1 - ( - ) (1- ) ik ik k k ik ik ik ik q q p p x b x b + + + = +             (6) 
The first order conditions of each player i for each demand shock k requiring that each player’s 
marginal revenue and marginal cost be equal:  
  ( )
R
ik
ik ik k ik
ik
dp
q F p c
dq
- = -                 (7) 






 as the slope of its inverse 
residual demand function. Firms are allowed to sign fixed-capacity contracts Fi specified as a quantity 
(in MW) depending on the contracting factor f and the installed capacity  i cap  by firm i:  i i F f cap = × . 
The pricing equation differs for the two models. In the Cournot equilibrium, each strategic player 
assumes the production of the other players as given, and therefore the slope of the residual inverse 
demand function depends only on the slope of the demand function (γ): 
  ( ) {Strategic Firms} ik i k ik q F p c i g - = - Î         (8) 
For the SFE model, the slope of the residual demand function depends on the slope of the demand 
function and the slope of the supply functions of the competitors (βj): 
  ( ) {Strategic Firms} ik i k ik jk
j i
q F p c i b g
¹
 
- = - + Î    
 
∑       (9) 
Beside the import elasticity, oligopolists face competitive production by several smaller firms forming 
the so called competitive fringe. The pricing behavior of competitive firms guarantees that marginal 
costs are equal to the market clearing price:
8 
  0 {Competitive Firms} k ik p c i - = Î           (10) 
The Cournot equilibrium is a solution of equations (4), (5), (8), (10) and a market clearing condition, 
and the SFE is a solution of equations (4), (5), (6), (9),(10) and a market clearing condition. The 
models are solved in GAMS using the CoinIpopt solver with a MATLAB interface to call up the 
GAMS code for different months and different contract covers  f . 
                                                       
8 In Willems et al. (2009) the fringe generator is assumed to be representable by a linear supply function, here we allow for a 
more flexible formulation.  
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3.2  Calibration  
Given the underlying dataset of the German electricity market in 2006 the Cournot and SFE models 
are simulated varying the contract coverage  f  of the oligopolists from 0% up to 100% of their 
installed generation capacities. The four large oligopolists (EON; RWE, Vattenfall, and EnBW) are 
assumed to behave strategically while the remaining generation capacities are clustered in a fringe 
firm which is bidding competitively. The resulting supply curves are then analyzed to obtain the 
optimal  contract  cover  f  using  the  observed  price-demand  results  at  the  EEX  spot  market  as  a 
benchmark: 
  ( )




P P f - ∑         Squared error mimization  (11) 
with 
obs
t P  the observed prices at the EEX and 
mod( ) t P f  the modeled prices given the contract cover 
f  at period t. The results are reported in Table 1. The Cournot model has on average a twice as high 
coverage than the SFE model. The optimal contract cover in 2006 for the Cournot model is 48% 
whereas the SFE model only has 22%. However, the variance of the SFE model is higher than Cournot 
model. The reason is that the results of the SFE-model are less sensitive to the contract factor, and 
hence the estimates for the contract factor are harder to calculate. Nevertheless, both models predict 
the observed market data reasonable well with an R² close to 0.8.  
Given these calibrated values for 2006, divestiture cases will be calculated. In order to do so, we 
assume that the amount of contracts is constant. We are therefore likely to either underestimate or 
overestimate the results depending on the change in contracting after the divestiture. For Cournot 
models Bushnell (2007) shows the relation between the price mark-up and contracting. In a simple 
setting with constant marginal costs the impact of contracts on the markup is similar to squaring the 
number of firms in the market. A divestiture from 2 to 4 firms with endogenous contracts will have the 
same effect as increasing the number of firms from 2 to 16 in a situation with fixed contracts. The 
situation becomes more complex with non constant marginal costs (this requires numerical simulations 
as  in  Bushnell),  risk  aversion  (which  leads  to  higher  contacting  positions,  Hughes,  1997),  with 
multiple  contracting  rounds  (with  2  contracting  rounds,  the  introduction  of  contracts  will  have  a 
similar effect as taking the cube of the number of firms), and (un)observability of contracting positions 
(contract unobservability reduces the strategic value of contract). Van Eijkel and Moraga-González 
(2009) analyze the impact of observability in a Cournot setting of a natural gas market. They show that 
in case of pure risk-hedging the level of contracts increases with the number of firms whereas in case 
of strategic incentives the impact varies with the observability. By contrast for SFE models the impact 
of contracts and the number of firms is unclear. 
Given  the  difficulties  in  determining  the  level  of  contracts  endogenously,  we  will,  in  our  basic 
analysis, keep the contract level after the divestiture constant. Instead we will perform a sensitivity 
study of the results, by varying the contract levels. We simulate a range of possible market outcomes  
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by varying the contract position with one standard deviation from the contract positions from our 
regression.  
 
Table 1: Optimal contract covers, pre-divestiture calibration, 2006 
  Contract 





Cournot  47.7  0.082  10.4  0.7888  4521 
SFE  22.4  0.2401  10.9  0.7702  4521 
Source: Own calculation  
4  Scenarios, results and discussion 
4.1  Scenarios 
Given the pre-divesture results of 2006, two divestiture cases are modeled to obtain predictions for 
2006 under different market structures. The first divestiture case (6 Strategic Firms Case) resembles a 
breaking up of the dominant duopoly of EON and RWE into four separate companies which each own 
a half of the pre-divested company, respectively. This divestiture could either be realized by forcing 
EON and RWE to split up their assets into separate companies (similar to unbundling) or to sell the 
separated  companies  to  interested  investors  (e.g.  foreign  companies,  or  financial  investors).  The 
resulting market structure would be a six-firm oligopoly were each firm owns about 10GW generation 
capacity and thus has no more than 15% market share.  
For the second divestiture case (Large Fringe Case) the duopoly of EON and RWE is also broken by 
forcing them to divest half of their capacities. However, the divested assets are sold to a lot of small 
companies and interested parties while enforcing that no buyer can obtain a significant market share. 
Thus, the divested plants become part of the competitive fringe and are no longer strategic companies. 
The resulting market structure would be a four-firm oligopoly like in the pre-divestiture case but with 
significantly reduced market shares (and an increase fringe size).  
Table  2  summarizes  the  changes  in  market  structure  before  and  after  divestiture.  Thus  the  C4 
concentration ratio, based on installed capacity, would decrease from about 80% before to about 50% 
after the divestiture with no firm having a capacity share above 15%. The HHI index for the German 
market based on installed capacities is also decreasing from an uncompetitive level of 2150 before the 
divestiture to a level of 1050 in the 6 Firm Case and to 700 in the Large Fringe Case. Thus the post-
divested market should provide market outcomes close to the competitive levels. 
 
Table 2: Concentration indicators: before and after divestitures 
  Pre-divestiture  6 Firms  Large Fringe 
C4  78%  54%  53% 
HHI  2150  1050  700 
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The supply curves of the divested firms are obtained by splitting up the power plant portfolio of EON 
and RWE into two identical subsets which are then transformed into cubic cost functions following the 
methodology described in Section 2. This symmetric divestiture guarantees that the resulting firm cost 
curves add up exactly to the pre-divestiture oligopoly cost curve. 
For both cases the monthly bidding curves are estimated using the calibrated contract cover to obtain 
hourly prices, overall welfare, and profit estimates. By keeping the contract factors constant, we may 
underestimate the effect of a divestiture, as divestitures would normally lead to an increase in the 
contract position. Afterwards two additional scenarios are simulated with a reduced and an increased 
contract coverage given by the obtained standard deviation for contracting in the calibration (see Table 
1).  
4.2  Results 
As  the  divestitures  increase  the  number  of  firms  and  reduce  the  market  share  of  the  strategic 
companies,  prices  decrease.  With  four  oligopolists  the  German  electricity  market  has  a  relatively 
“low” market concentration given the European context; thus, France and Belgium are dominated by a 
single firm. One could therefore conjecture that a further concentration reduction may only result in 
small  price  effects,  particularly  if  the  divested  assets  are  bought  by  other  strategic  firms.  The 
simulation results do not confirm this hypothesis. For both models the divestiture of EON and RWE 
significantly reduces the equilibrium supply curves. For high demand levels, the bids are partially 
lower, whereas for lower demand levels the changes are less pronounced. As expected, the Large 
Fringe case produces a more competitive outcome than the 6 Firm case. The divestitures bring the bid 
curves closer to the market’s marginal costs curve (Figure 1). 
Overall, the average peak prices can be reduced by about 6 €/MWh in the 6 Firm Case and by an 
additional  2 €/MWh  in  the  Large  Fringe  Case  which  brings  them  significantly  closer  to  the 
competitive level (Table 3). The lower prices lead to an increase in consumer surplus and a reduction 
of producer surplus. In sum the first effect exceeds the second leading to an overall welfare increase 
for Germany.
9 However, revenues for importers decline as both the amount they import as the price at 
which  they  sell,  is  reduced.  Welfare  abroad  is  therefore  negatively  affected  by  the  divestitures. 
Combining German and foreign effects still leads to an overall welfare increase of about 200 million € 
per year. Although the German welfare increase in the Large Fringe case is higher, this is offset by a 
larger welfare reduction abroad leading to nearly similar overall welfare effects in both cases.  
The difference between the Cournot and the SFE model are relatively small. Both models predict 
similar results for the effect of a change in market structure (Table 3).  
 
                                                       
9 This is not obvious as production efficiency might be negatively impacted by the divestiture.  
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Figure 1: Cournot and SFE supply curves, January 2006 
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Table 3: Price and welfare results for peak hours compared to pre-divestiture, 2006 
  Competitive  Pre-Divestiture  6 Firm   Large Fringe 
  (C)  (SFE)  (C)  (SFE)  (C)  (SFE) 
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Foreign welfare effect 
[bn €/a] 
      -0.29  -0.32  -0.37  -0.42 
Total welfare effect 
[bn €/a] 
      +0.20  +0.23  +0.21  +0.24 
Source: Own calculation 
The estimations of the contract positions were subject to some uncertainty. The uncertainty was larger 
for SFEs than in the Cournot case, as contract positions have a smaller effect in the SFE model, and 
therefore harder to recover empirically. To test the sensitivity of our results to the contract position, we 
vary  in  a  second  part  of  the  analysis  the  contract  coverage  with  one  standard  deviation  of  our 
estimation quality. With a higher contract position the companies will bid more aggressively in the 
spot market leading to a further reduction of prices and corresponding surplus and quantity effects. 
                                                       
10  Productive  inefficiency  is  measured  by  comparing  production  costs  in  the  Cournot/SFE  solution  with  a  competitive 
counterfactual industry supply the same level of domestic demand and the same level of export as in the divested oligopoly 
model. Note that this is a different simulation than the competitive scenario (where both demand and import levels are 
higher).  
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The opposite is true if the contract position decreases. Table 4 summarized the simulated results. For 
all cases the price reduction and surplus change directions of the divestiture remain stable. However, 
for  the  reduced  contracting  cases  the  differences  to  the  pre-divestiture  situation  are  significantly 
reduced. The resulting predictions show that price will drop from 58.2 to somewhere in the range 
between 48.5 and 56.6 in the 6 firm Cournot case with an approximate 60% certainty, and from 58.7 to 
in the range 50.9 to 54.4 in the 6 firm SFE model. In the Large Fringe case the upper price levels are 
further reduced whereas the lower boundary remains on a relatively similar level as in the 6 Firm case 
and is close to the competitive benchmark. 
 
Table 4: Impact of varying contract coverage (+/-one standard deviation) 
Scenario  6 Firm Case  Large Fringe Case 
Model  Cournot  SFE  Cournot  SFE 
Contracts  Less  More  Less  More  Less  More  Less  More 
Average peak 
price [€/MWh] 
56.6 €  48.5 €  54.4 €  50.9 €  53.5 €  48.4 €  51.5 €  49.6 € 
Average German 
generation [GW] 
57.5  59.0  57.9  58.6  58.1  59.0  58.5  58.8 
Average  
imports [GW] 
10.4  8.9  10.0  9.3  9.8  8.9  9.5  9.1 
Consumer 
expenses [bn €/a] 
18.00  15.51  17.34  16.20  17.01  15.42  16.40  15.77 
Producer  
surplus [bn €/a] 
7.78  6.57  7.32  7.16  7.78  6.50  7.30  6.80 
Source: Own calculation 
 
4.3  Discussion 
Comparing the pre- and post-divestiture market results shows clear price and surplus effects of the 
proposed divestiture cases. As prices significantly decrease, the consumer expenses decrease as well, 
leading to a consumers’ surplus gain. This is accompanied by a decrease in domestic producers’ 
surplus. The net effect for consumers and generators is a surplus of more than 500 million € per year 
for Germany (Table 3).  
Note that domestic demand is assumed to be perfectly inelastic. Hence, a lower price does not lead to a 
reduction of consumer dead weight loss within Germany. The 500 million € benefit comes from three 
sources: (1) production efficiency in Germany increases, (2) electricity is bought more cheaply abroad, 
(a terms of trade effect) (3) a reduction of congestion rents on cross-border flows (this is a transfer 
from network operators to network users). However, lower prices in Germany will also have an effect 
on other countries. It will hurt foreign producers and benefit foreign consumers. Both the net import 
levels and the prices at which it is traded decline. In sum foreign markets face a welfare reduction of 
300 to 400 million € per year (Table 3). Counterweighing domestic and foreign effects a net surplus of 
about 200 million € can be obtained.  
  13
Furthermore, the productive inefficiency due to capacity withholding can be reduced by divesting the 
two larger companies from about 80 million € per year to about 30 million € in the Cournot setting and 
less than 20 million € in the SFE setting. 
Table 5 shows that in the pre-divestiture situation the oligopolists’ surplus is significantly higher than 
under  pure  competitive  conditions.  Also  fringe  firms,  acting  as  price  takers,  profit  from  the 
oligopolistic price setting, as they can free ride on the capacity withholding of the strategic firms and 
the resulting higher prices.  
By divesting the two larger German companies, the surplus of the oligopolists and the fringe firms can 
be greatly reduced. In the 6 Firm Case revenues drop by about 15% for strategic companies.
11 In 
contrast, all competitive fringe firms combined face a significant larger surplus reduction (of more 
than 20%) highlighting the impact of capacity withholding by the strategic companies. 
In the Large Fringe Case the average company surplus drops by about 20%. The surplus generated by 
the divested assets that are sold to fringe companies (see Table 5, EON2 and RWE2) are slightly 
higher  than  the  remaining  assets  that  are  modeled  as  strategic  companies  (as  those  firms  do  not 
withhold capacity, but obtain the same price as the strategic firms). As in the Base Line Case, fringe 
generators benefit from the oligopolistic players withholding capacity and driving up prices.  
As the German companies own a mixed power plant fleet of base and peak units consisting partly of 
depreciated plants it is hard to derive an assessment whether the surplus is beyond the necessary 
margin for fixed cost recovery and what impact the divestiture will have in the long run on investment 
signals. The average return per MW is about 60.000 € per year in the competitive benchmark and 
about 90.000 € per year for the strategic firms in the pre-divestiture setting. Assuming a life time of 20 
years and an interest rate of 6% the fixed costs of a power plant range between 44.000 and 130.000 € 
per MW per year for overnight costs of 500 €/kW and 1500 €/kW respectively. Thus given a mixed 
portfolio of less cost intensive peakers and more costly base load units the obtained revenue values 
seem reasonable to assure cost recovery.  
As a divestiture can be seen as a reversed merger it is interesting to assess whether the profit changes 
are in line with standard theory on mergers. In a standard Cournot game with constant marginal costs, 
a merger will lead to a reduction of overall profit of the merging firms, unless the merging firms own a 
large fraction of total demand, or the merger creates large cost reductions (Salant et al. 1983). In our 
case, the firms have upward sloping marginal cost functions, and this result is therefore no longer valid 
(Fauli-Oller, 1997). Here a merged firm (the pre-divestiture firms) may have a higher profit level than 
the sum of the profits of the separate firms (the post-divestiture firms). We also see in our simulations 
that mergers are more profitable in the SFE model than in the Cournot model.  
The results of our simulations are subject to some restrictions. First, the contract coverage obtained 
during the calibration may not be the one applied in the post-divested market. In the Cournot model, 
firms have an incentive to increase their contract coverage in response to a merger. In the SFE model, 
the strategic effects of contracts are less clear cut. Second, the cubic cost function assumption neglects  
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capacity constraints which may lead to higher prices. This is also true for imports as the constant 
import  elasticity  may  overestimate  competition  from  abroad.  And  finally  the  characteristics  of 
electricity markets can lead to situations not captured by the model, e.g. strategic behavior by small 
firms in peak times with little capacity reserves. 
 
Table 5: Company surplus, in bn € per year 
  Competitive 
Benchmark 
Pre-Divestiture  6 Firm Case  4 Firm Case 
  Cournot  SFE  Cournot  SFE  Cournot  SFE 
EON 1        1.033  1.035  0.974  0.966 
EON 2        1.033  1.035  0.982  0.974 








RWE 1        0.970  0.975  0.902  0.894 
RWE 2        0.970  0.975  0.921  0.910 
































Source: Own calculation 
 
5  Conclusion 
In this paper competition policy and divestiture in electricity markets are analyzed. Based on the case 
of Germany it is shown that a reduced market concentration can provide welfare benefits. Applying a 
Cournot and SFE model two divestiture cases are analyzed that both lead to a similar peak-price 
reduction  and  welfare  gains.  Although  foreign  markets  face  a  welfare  reduction  due  to  the  price 
decrease  and  reduced  imports  from  Germany,  the  overall  impact  counterweighing  domestic  and 
foreign effects shows a positive welfare gain. 
The results also show that in the case of Germany divested assets should be sold to independent and 
small firms, preventing the emergence of further strategic players. Providing this setting a reduction of 
consumer expenses of more than 2 bn € per year, and a peak price reduction of up to 8 €/MWh can be 
achieved taking 2006 as reference year. 
Even though this paper highlights that divestures can increase the competitiveness of oligopolistic 
electricity markets the question whether it is the best fitted instrument for that task is not answered. 
Divestiture is generally considered a “hard” instrument of competition policy and thus may result in 
significant  opposition  by  the  concerned  companies  that  delay  its  implementation.  An  acceptable 
alternative may be provided by virtual divestures with a limited duration. Whether other measurements 
like  the  increase  in  cross-border  transmission  capacity  and  the  further  integration  of  congestion 
                                                                                                                                                                      
11 The two non-divested firms (Vattenfall and EnBW) face similar changes as the two divested firms (EON and RWE).  
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management schemes may provide a similar or higher benefit is subject to further research. In addition 
a  translation  of  the  result  for the  German  case  to other  markets  is  not  advisable  given  the  large 
divergence in the market structures among European electricity markets. 
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